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RELATING TO THE LATE

N E G O T I A T I O N .

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REPORT TO THE LATE

NEGOTIATION.

(The Chinese and Japanese)

SENTIMENTS

RELATING TO THE LATE

NEGOTIATION.




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
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M D C C I X



SENTIMENTS, &c.

THE publication of the papers relating to the late negotiation, has brought to light a transaction which I cannot help considering as one of the most amazing that history can produce. A transaction so extremely remarkable, and of such infinite importance, that every true Briton I should suppose would consider it as an object highly deserving his most attentive consideration. It will not only inform him of the state of this negotiation, and the reasons why it was broke off, but it will also clearly explain the real merits of a late Minister who enjoyed their most unbounded good opinion. In my remarks on these original papers, I shall proceed in the most unprejudiced and dispassionate manner; I shall attempt to lay before the reader the real tendency of the designs of both courts, or in other words, of their Ministers, and the necessary consequences which must have inevitably attended the peace, had it been concluded on the foundation which we now see was sketched out for it.

For many months past, the people of England have amused themselves with arguments concerning the comparative value of North-America and Guadalupe; how will they be surprized on reading these papers to find, that the latter was designed to be given up, and in fact the former also! How will the thinking part of this nation wonder to find a share in the Newfoundland-fishery granted to the French, for the trifling consideration of the demolition of Dunkirk! How, in short, will they be astonished, at the whole of this strange negotiation! the most absurd, the most contradictory, and the most unpolitical negotiation on the part of England that could have been prosecuted!—We have carried on a most expensive war in every part of the world; and our arms, through the blessing of God, have hitherto prospered. We have made several

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very advantageous acquisitions, which, if we keep them, will repay our enormous expences, by encreasing our commerce, and ruining the trade of our enemies. The most shallow politician surely would pronounce at once, that the very first object of a peace with France, ought to be a preservation of our present extensive commerce; I shall endeavour to explain whether this important point met with that attention from the late minister, which it so evidently deserved. But as it is my design to convince the reader by sound arguments founded on facts, rather than by any declamatory exclamations, I shall at once proceed and criticise on the most important articles of this famous negotiation.

The French ministry by way of introduction to their historical memorial, have prefixed a recapitulation of the chief events of the war, thrown into such a light as best served their turn; after which follow some letters that passed between the duke de Choiseul and Mr. Pitt, concerning the *basis* of the ensuing negotiation, and *epochs* to be referred to; as there was no settled agreement between the two courts on these points, I shall not detain the reader with any remarks on them, but pass to a memorial of the French ministry of much greater consequence, dated the 15th of July, 1761.

ARTICLE I.

The king cedes and guaranties Canada to the King of England, such as it has been, and in right ought to be possessed by France, without restriction, and without the liberty of returning upon any pretence whatever against this cession and guaranty, and without interrupting the crown of England in the entire possession of Canada. The king in making over his full right of sovereignty over Canada to the King of England, annexes four conditions to the cession. 1. That the free exercise of the Roman catholic religion shall be maintained there. 2. That the French inhabitants and others, may sell their effects and retire. 3. That the limits of Canada with regard to Louisiana shall be established, as well as those of Louisiana and Virginia. 4. That the liberty of fishing and of drying their cod-fish on the banks of Newfoundland, may be confirmed to the French as heretofore: and as this confirmation would be illusory, if the French vessels had not a shelter in those parts appertaining to their nation, the King of Great-Britain in consideration of the guaranty of his new conquests, shall restore Isle Royale or Cape Breton, to be enjoyed by France in entire sovereignty. It is agreed to fix a value on this restitution, that France shall not under any denomination whatever, erect any fortifications on the island, and shall confine herself to maintain civil establishments there, and the port for the convenience of the fishing vessels landing there.

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In the memorial in answer to this, the entire possession of Canada without any limits or exceptions, is insisted on, and the demand of Cape Breton absolutely rejected; but in consideration of Dunkirk being demolished, it is agreed that the subjects of France shall fish and dry their fish on part of the banks of Newfoundland under certain restrictions. The French then delivered an ultimatum in answer to this memorial, wherein they insisted on the Roman catholic religion being tolerated in Canada; and instead of Cape Breton, demanded the island of St. John, or such other port for the purposes above-mentioned; and as Great-Britain in her memorial had objected to the adjacent countries between Canada, Louisiana, and the English colonies being considered as appertaining to Louisiana, the French now proposed that these countries should be neuter, and serve as a barrier between the two nations. On the 1st of September the answer of England to this ultimatum was delivered, and insisted that,

Canada should be ceded to Great-Britain, according to the limits traced out by the marquis de Vaudreuil, when he surrendered the said province to Sir J. Amherst; that the Roman catholic religion should be tolerated, That in consideration of Dunkirk being demolished, the island of St. Pierre should be ceded to France, on condition that no fortifications should be erected, or troops maintained; and that it should serve as a shelter for no other nation besides France; nor was it to give any right of fishing in other places than those expressly mentioned; and lastly, that an English commissary should be allowed to reside there.

That as to the limits of Louisiana, the French had comprehended such countries in their sketch as could not be agreed to——The French ministry delivered an answer to this, but it had no reply.—

I have here, in as short a compass as possible, given the substance of the whole negotiation on the article which related to North-America. And I cannot but remark, that we did not enter into the present war with a design to conquer Canada, but only to *secure our colonies*; and I think it will not be very difficult to prove, that this end would not by any means have been answered, had the French court agreed to the above terms, which would inevitably have produced another war. The very first article in this negotiation ought to have ceded *all* North-America to us, for Canada alone would have answered no single purpose, but our possessing ourselves of the fur trade, which is a very inconsiderable thing. By letting them remain in possession of Louisiana, we leave to them one of the finest countries in the world, *situated along the back of our colonies*; which situation would give them those very advantages which they enjoyed, by being possessed of Canada; the ability of invading and en-

encroaching on us whenever they pleased. This extensive country has been universally allowed to be of forty times the importance of Canada ; it produces every thing which the latter does, and a vast variety of other articles. But its situation is what ought particularly to have made a British Ministry determine never to leave it in the possession of France. Let us cast our eyes on a map of these immense regions, and we shall see at once, that the French would have even greater opportunities to *encroach* on us from Louisiana than from Canada, and for this plain reason ; the countries between it and our colonies, are of a much greater extent (more than double) than those which part our possessions from Canada. The French very artfully propose, that these should be *neutral*, but the British Memorial rejects that proposal, because they *contain nations under the protection of Great-Britain*. Now it is very plain from hence, that these intermediate nations would in fact be under neither France nor England, and consequently either would be able to encroach on the other : this was the case with Canada where the intermediate space was not half so extensive. A little reflection will make this assertion appear to be well grounded.

Between the two Carolinas and Louisiana are many nations of Indians under a variety of names, which are said, in the British memorial, to be under our protection, yet some of these Indians are at this present time actually at war with us ; witness the expedition of Colonel Grant, and the many advices we have had from the back settlements of Carolina, of their invasions. As a proof also how little these Indians are under our protection, or rather dominion, we need but observe in the map the several French forts in the heart of their country, particularly *fort Condé* ; and I cannot but observe that it is a flagrant instance of ignorance in the British Minister not to mention these French forts in his Memorial which asserts, that the countries here situated are under British protection. Can it be supposed he would not have taken notice of this had he known it ? Not mentioning it on such an opportunity, is almost a contradiction to his other assertion. Does it not from hence appear that these countries which were to have formed a barrier, would at any time be open to the encroachments of the French ? The Indians of the Five Nations formed the barrier between our colonies and Canada, and were under the protection of the King of Great-Britain, but we found, by dear bought experience, that the French were nevertheless able to command their country by means of the forts which we have since happily conquered.

If that perfidious nation was able to usurp such very considerable tracts of country on the borders of Virginia, and our more northern colonies, how much more able will they be to play the same game in those immense unknown countries

tries of the Creek and Chicafaw Indians? On the Ohio they could not build a warehouse but it was presently known to our back settlers, but in Louisiana they may erect another Lisle without our knowing any thing of the matter, and may soon win over to their interests all the intermediate Indians: a task we have no reason to think will prove difficult, since they have already brought them to make war upon us, and have built forts in their countries. Yet these Indians are supposed, by the British ministry, to be under our protection, and are to form this famous barrier *. Had we insisted on the Mississippi being regarded as the bounds of Louisiana, the above objections would in a great measure have been rejected, but our amazing ignorance in demanding the protection of these countries without specifying the exact limits of the French colony, must necessarily lead us into many mistakes greatly to our prejudice. The British Memorial asserts, that such and such Indian nations are under our protection; why not say, that *all the Indian nations of whatever name, whose countries are situated on the east side of the river Mississippi are and ought to be regarded as under the protection of Great-Britain, and any forts or lands in possession of the French in the said countries shall be directly demolished and regarded as usurpations, particularly fort Condé and fort Toulouse.* Now let me ask any unprejudiced man whether such expressions would not have conveyed a much clearer idea of the countries than the vague ones used by the British Minister? The nations which he asserts are under our protection all extend to the Mississippi, and yet he omitted that demand which could not be misconstrued.

* It is so far from my intention to interpret any thing contrary to its real meaning that I shall give the words of the British Memorial on these intermediate Indians.

"As to what respects the line to be drawn from Rio Perdido as contained in the note remitted by M. Buffy with regard to the limits of Louisiana his Majesty is obliged to reject so unexpected a proposition as by no means admissible in two respects.

1. Because the said line, under colour of fixing the limits of Louisiana, annexes vast countries to that province, which with the commanding posts and forts, the Marquis de Vaudreuil has, by the most solemn capitulation incontestably yielded into the possession of his Britannic Majesty, under the description of Canada, and that consequently however contentious the pretensions of the two crowns may have been before the war, and particularly with respect to the course of the Ohio, and the territories in that part since the surrender of Canada, and the line of its limits has been traced as aforesaid by the Marquis de Vaudreuil, all those opposite titles are united, and become valid without contradiction, to confirm to Great-Britain with all the rest of Canada the possession of those countries on *that part* of the Ohio which have been heretofore contested.

2. The line proposed to fix the bounds of Louisiana cannot be admitted because it would comprise in another part on the side of the Carolinas, very extensive countries and numerous nations who have always been reputed to be under the protection of the King, a right which his Majesty has no intention of renouncing; and then the King, for the advantage of peace, might consent to leave the intermediate countries under the protection of Great-Britain, and particularly the Cherokees, the Creeks, the Chicafaws, the Chaftaws, and another nation, situate between the British settlements and the Mississippi."

Perhaps

Perhaps it may be said in answer to this, *that the sketch here presented to the publick by the French court is only a rough draught of the peace that cannot be considered as positive in any particular.* Agreed: but does not this *rough draught* give us the sentiments of our Minister on every point? The British Memorial takes notice particularly of other limits more northerly, and of the limits (in some degree) of the French cod fishery, but only presents us with this vague account of those of Louisiana; the same Memorial is also particular in many other respects, but this care happens to be where it is of least importance. I shall here give the fifteenth article of the peace of Utrecht, which relates to the limits of the French and English colonies, as it will throw some light on the present argument. “ The subjects of France inhabiting Canada, “ and others, shall hereafter give no hindrance or molestation to the Five Nations or cantons of Indians, subject to the dominion of Great-Britain, nor “ to the other natives of America, who are friends to the same. In like “ manner the subjects of Great-Britain shall behave themselves peaceably towards the Americans, who are subjects or friends to France; and on both “ sides they shall enjoy full liberty of going and coming on account of trade. “ As also the natives of those countries shall with the same liberty resort as “ they please to the British and French colonies, for promoting trade on one side “ and the other, without any molestation or hindrance, either on the part of the “ British subjects or of the French. But it is to be exactly and distinctly “ settled by commissaries, who are, and who ought to be accounted the subjects “ and friends of Britain or of France.”

This article absolutely gives up the dominion of the Five Nations to Great-Britain, the treaty of Aix le Chappelle confirmed the same, and also left the decision of the limits to commissaries; therefore does more than the British Memorial requires in the late negotiation, with respect to the southern Indians who are *only under our protection*: and yet the French no sooner signed these treaties than they immediately began to encroach. Can we expect that they should be more complaisant for the future? And especially when we give them a greater opportunity of doing it with impunity? If the treaties above-mentioned had defined the bounds of the two colonies to be the river St. Lawrence, no difficulties could have arisen: and had the British Memorial in the like manner insisted on the Mississippi being the limit of Louisiana, it would have added very much to the security of our plantations. This Memorial only mentions the King of Great-Britain's claim to the protection of the Indians in question, and consequently gives up any claim we may have to the dominion over their country, a stroke which is certainly the most impolitic that could possibly have been thought of. The nature of the European colonies in North America makes it impossible to define

define exactly to which nation such or such a tract of country *really originally belonged*, whether by purchase or grant from the natives; the above article of the treaty of Utrecht yielded and allowed the *dominion* of the Five Nations to belong to us, although the limits of their country were not settled. If we enquire into the real state of the case, we shall find we have full as clear a right to the *dominion* over the southern Indians as over the Iroquois, or Five Nations; but let this be as it may, we ought undoubtedly to have insisted on it in a treaty with a European power; instead of which we gave up (in the British Memorial) the right to a *dominion* over them for a right which in the very nature of things cannot possibly exist; that of *protection*. How can we pretend to be the protectors of a people, who are so far from being protected by us, that they are now at war with us and in league with our enemies? Was there ever such a right heard of, as that of one nation *protecting* another against its consent, and absolutely contrary to its desire? Such is the right which is so strenuously insisted on in this Memorial!

This notion of protection is absurd in another respect. If we only call ourselves the protectors of these nations of Indians, I have already shown we can have no right to a sovereignty over their country, and consequently cannot pretend to prevent their doing what they please in, and with it. The nations mentioned in the British Memorial, are the Cherokees, Creeks, Chikasaws, Chactaws, *and another nation*; which other nation I take to be the Alibamous, or else the Flat Heads. Now the country which those Indians inhabit is upwards of four hundred miles broad and above six hundred long, each as the crow flies. The breadth is from the Mississippi to the planted parts of Carolina, and the length from the Gulph of Mexico to countries south of the Ohio. This immense tract of the country is wider than any part of our colonies that are situated against it; and would have been only *under our protection* by this Memorial. The Indians might certainly sell half of it to the French for gunpowder and brandy, and yet be protected by us, and this would have just the consequences that the undetermined limits of Canada were attended with. The French are already in possession of great part of these countries by means of Forts Condé and Toulouse, the latter of which is three hundred miles from the Mississippi; and without doubt they would encompass our colonies with a chain of forts from the Gulph of Mexico to the Ohio; what terrible consequences this would have I need not point out to the reader; and what makes this past a doubt is, they would have a *right* to do this if they got the Indians consent.

There cannot be a more false notion than to imagine the countries in North America can be considered in the same manner as those in Europe: when we talk of a country here, that should be considered as a barrier between two nations,

tions, it is the very reverse of what it is in America. Flanders has always been considered as the barrier between France and the Dutch; the King of Sardinia's dominions, may be called the barrier between France and Italy; but these countries are really barriers; the French can possess themselves of none of the barrier towns in Dutch Flanders without making war; many are garrisoned with Dutch soldiers, and no part of the country can *be bought by the French for brandy or gunpowder*; add to this the whole country is known. In America the countries which would have separated the possessions of the two nations, must naturally be attended with the *very* contrary circumstances in every respect.

In order to shew that the British Minister himself regarded these Indian nations, as a barrier between the English colonies and Louisiana, we need only turn to the Memorial of the 29th of July, in which are these words—*the nations and countries which lie intermediate, and which form the true barrier between the aforesaid provinces, not being proper on any account, to be directly or by necessary consequence ceded to France, &c.* The meaning of these words cannot be disputed, and they shew in the clearest manner that Great-Britain's only security for her colonies depended on the good faith of France. One remarkable instance of the very same nature, will tell us what certainty there is in that. By the extract I have already given from the treaty of Utrecht it appears that France acknowledged the sovereignty of England over the Iroquois or Five Nations, but yet she built her chain of forts on the Ohio, almost as soon as the treaty of Aix le Chappelle (which confirmed it) was signed; now it is very well known that fort du Quesne, stands in the very center of the Iroquois country. Let us see the foundation on which she pretended a right to this tract. In a memorial delivered by the Duke de Mirepoix to the British Ministry May 14, 1755, is the following article.

“ It is incontestible from the principles which agree with the titles, with justice, with the law of convenience and the mutual security, that the Ohio ought to make part of the possessions of France. The English have no settlements on this river, and when the British Ministers maintained this proposition; that the sources of this river are full of antient settlements of their nation; it was plain they had trusted too much to false relations. The French have always looked on this river as dependent upon Canada, and it is essential to her, in order to the communication of Canada with Louisiana; they have frequented it at all times, and in numbers. It was even by this river that they sent the detachment of troops which were sent to Louisiana about the year 1739, on occasion of the war of the Chikafaws*.” Such are the rights which France pretended to

contrary

* The remainder is as follows, “ Had there been English settlements then on that river, and had it been a part of the British colonies, would the French have been suffered to descend its whole course;

contrary to the most solemn treaties ! Had peace been concluded on the terms offered by the British Ministry, we should in a few years have had her asserting the *law of convenience*, and grasping at all that immense tract of country which she just before acknowledged to be *under our protection*. When we have been so recently used in the most perfidious manner by that nation, can any reasons upon earth be sufficient to make us give them an opportunity to do the very same again ! No two cases can possibly be more parallel than the treaties of Utrecht and Aix, and the late negotiation, in respect to intermediate countries. By the former the country of the Iroquois was acknowledged to be under our dominion, and was to be the boundary between Canada and the English colonies ; by the latter the countries inhabited by the southern Indians were to be under the protection of Great-Britain, and to serve as a barrier between the two nations. Nothing can be more alike than these cases, and we may depend upon it that the consequences will also be just alike if ever we are so mad as to conclude such a peace.

If the Mississippi is not made the limit of Louisiana (and we see clearly no such thing was thought of in the late negotiation) and all the countries east of that river ceded in full sovereignty to Great-Britain, we shall give up the very end for which we went to war, *the security of our colonies* ; for the French by means of a few forts more added in a chain to those of Toulouffe and Condé, will be able to confine us into a narrow slip against the sea of not a greater breadth than three hundred miles, whilst their colony of Louisiana will be above a thou-

course ; or would not the court of London have at least made complaints of it ? But at that time there was no question nor the least mention made, of the pretension which has been raised up since ; without proof, without title, and without any sort of foundation. It is true that in latter years some English traders have passed the mountains of Virginia, and have ventured to carry on a fur trade towards the Ohio with the savages. The French governors of Canada contented themselves at first, with sending them word that they were on the territory of France, and forbidding them to return on pain of having their goods seized, and themselves made prisoners : they returned notwithstanding, and their goods have been confiscated and sold, and their persons seized and conducted to Quebec, from thence to France, where they have been detained in the prisons of Rochelle : no claim, no complaint was made on this occasion by the court of London ; they have been considered only as smugglers, whose desire of gain had exposed them to the risque attending an illicit trade. Having thus *ascertained with so much solidity* the right and possession of the French on the Ohio and its territory, their being satisfied to stipulate, that all the territory between the Ohio and the mountains which border Virginia, shall remain neutral, and that all trade and passage through it shall be interdicted as well to the French as to the English, ought to be considered as a very sensible proof of their love of peace."

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land miles wide*. We cannot reasonably suppose that the French would neglect building such forts as soon as such a peace was concluded; their former conduct on the Ohio tells us very plainly that they know their own interest perfectly well, and if we may judge by *our* conduct, much better than we did ours. If a peace had been concluded on the terms offered in the late negotiation they would have had a right to erect these forts, with only getting the consent of the Indians. Now it cannot be asserted that we should not have suffered them, and should have restrained them by a clause in the treaty, because we in the very same article give up our right to do that by saying that these Indians are under our protection, and they are supposed throughout the negotiation to be independent nations. But every quibble, every dispute would have been rectified, had our Minister insisted on the Mississippi being the boundary *of the possessions of the two crowns* in those parts; that river is two or three miles wide in its whole course through these countries: such a boundary could not have been mistook, and by our planting the bank on our side directly, we should soon obtain a thorough knowledge of the whole country, and put it out of the power of the French to *encroach* without *openly invading*.

I have hitherto endeavoured to convince the reader that the peace, had it been concluded on the plan proposed by the British Minister, must necessarily have left our American colonies insecure, although their security was the original end of our entering into the present war. I think I have proved, and from facts, rather than empty reasoning, that this insecurity would have been owing to our not insisting on the Mississippi being made the limit of Louisiana, and our colonies; and I conceive that it will take very little ingenuity to convince the unprejudiced, that the British Minister ought by all means to have insisted on France ceding *all North America* to Great-Britain; and that such a conduct would have been much more wise and more for the interest of his country than keeping a share of the neutral islands, or Senegal and Goree, or even than the East Indies. — Canada is of little or no importance to us; and of none to the French unless connected with Louisiana†; we might have learned this truth long ago, had

* I cannot avoid once for all assuring the reader, that I do not hazard these assertions relating to the extent of the countries in question, without having first examined them in the best maps, with the most scrupulous attention. Without having consulted good maps, no person can speak on the point without making many mistakes.

† "The truth of the matter is, they were tired of Canada. The inclemency of the climate, the difficult access to it; and a trade scarcely defraying the expence of the colony, would long ago have induced them to abandon it, if the plan of extending its boundaries, at the expence of the English, and of opening its communication with Louisiana and with the ocean, had not made them persevere:

had we attended more to their schemes of uniting them by their chain of forts. When once they had rendered this chain strong enough, they would have given their greatest attention to the southern parts *as colonies*. Canada produces nothing that can ever possibly make a colony flourishing; and our being possessed of it, will be of no further consequence to us, than adding to the security of our *northern* colonies, and gaining about one hundred and forty thousand pounds worth of furs, annually. The uncultivated lands of our own plantations, are far more fertile than the barren wastes of Canada. But how different a country is Louisiana! capable of bearing almost any thing from the temper of the sky, the goodness of the soil, and from the multitude of long, deep, and beautiful rivers, with which it is every where enriched and adorned; these are most of them navigable for hundreds of miles into the country. They are principally the Mississippi, whose head is unknown, but it almost goes quite through North America, and at certain seasons overflows its banks for a vast way on both sides the Ouabache, almost equal to the Danube; the great rivers Alabama, Mobile, and several others. The face of the country is almost wholly plain covered with stately woods, or spread into very fine meadows. In short Louisiana, particularly the northern part, (for the mouth of the Mississippi is barren) without any of those heightenings which it received, when it was made the instrument to captivate so many to their ruin, is in all respects a most desirable place*. The French settled here raise some indigo, a good deal of cotton, some corn and rice, with lumber for their islands; but the colony is not very vigorous on account of the shoals and sands, with which the mouth of the Mississippi is in a manner choaked up, and which denies access to any very large ships; the French have according to their usual cautions and wise custom, erected several forts in the most material places, and fortified New Orleans their capital, and indeed the only city in Louisiana, in a regular manner. This city is not remarkably fair, large, or rich: but it is laid out regularly in a fine situation, on the banks of the Mississippi, in prospect of an higher fortune. The whole colony is said not to contain above ten thousand souls whites and negroes†, yet with all its disadvantages this colony is not declining, and if ever they should make the mouth of the Mississippi more tractable (and what is impossible to ambition and industry?) Louisiana will in a few years wear quite another face. It will supply their West-Indies with boards, staves, horses, mules, and provi-

persevere: Canada itself is not worth their asking, and if they do desire to have it restored to them, it can only be with a view to repeat the same injuries and infidelities, to punish which, we engaged in the present war." *Earl of Bath's Letter to two Great Men*, p. 30.

* See the account of the European settlements in America.

† Other accounts make them fifteen thousand.

sions. It will send tobacco into France; and increasing the conveniencies of its mother country and sister colonies, it will increase its own traffic, its inhabitants, and its power."

This description of Louisiana, which is extremely just, I have extracted from more authors than one, and it shows very clearly the immense importance of that vast country. But how will it flourish when it becomes the only object of the regard of the French in North America? When the expence which attended Canada is laid out on this promising settlement, where every thing conspires to render it a most formidable rival to our American power. How easy will it be for the French, in case of a new war to invade our colonies from hence? And when once they have cultivated, and experienced the great advantages resulting from the possession of it, we may be very certain that they will spare no costs in strengthening it, and by keeping up a strong body of troops here, (which they may do for much less expence than in Old France) they will put our plantations to the immense expence of erecting barrier forts for the extent of upwards of a thousand miles, and when a war breaks out, they can at any time invade our southern, and weakest provinces*. Here it may be said, *that we shall at any time be able to repel force by force, and to conquer Louisiana as we have done Canada;* a poor and insufficient answer! The conquest of Canada has actually cost us eighty millions! and so we are to leave Louisiana in the hands of the French, because, in case they encroach, as they always have done, we shall at any time be able to repel them at the small expence of eighty millions!—But can we answer, that the French will be as easily drove out of the latter, as they have been out of the former: the conquest we have already made, baffled all our efforts for years, and at last was won but by a miracle; for all parties now agree that Wolfe's success can be considered in no other light. Will not the French rather take the greatest care to secure themselves with every possible precaution? Can a fleet of British first rate ships of war, sail up to New Orleans, as they did to Quebec; and altho' we might have easily taken it by General Amherst's army being navigated down the Ohio and Mississippi, yet it will not be, ten years hence, so weak as it is now. Quebec was not half so strong as New Orleans might be made at a small expence, for it stands on a dead flat, and surrounded with marshes and lakes.

* "For if we can have no security whilst the French have any place from whence they may invade our colonies, you ought to have carried your demands still further; you ought to have demanded the whole country of Louisiana; because from thence France undoubtedly may invade our colonies, and what is of *more* consideration, the weakest of our colonies, those to the southward," *Mr. Townsend's Remarks on a letter to two Great Men*, p. 51.

If the French thought it so well worth their while to fortify and cultivate, the barren colony of Canada, how much more pains will they take with Louisiana, where all their expence will be amply repaid by its vast fertility; and where a little industry will have such great effects, as to render it one of the most important colonies in the world. The river St. Lawrence is froze up for near three quarters of the year; but Louisiana has many bays and mouths of rivers on the Gulph of Mexico, which are always open, and where capacious harbours may be made. In short, we cannot possibly form too high an idea of the vast importance of this country; and we shall undoubtedly in a few years (if we leave it in the hands of the French) repent our not insisting, that the first article of the peace should cede *all North-America* to Great-Britain. An attentive consideration of the late negotiation, will plainly tell us, that, had the French thought of making peace at all, we might have got such a cession made, instead of others less important to us. But even if their ministry had refused to agree to such an article at first, we should never have thought of making peace without it*.

And

* " — This was one of their great reasons for being so intent upon securing the Mississippi, and driving the Spaniards from about it at Pensacola in 1719, because they say, " This navigation to Louisiana, will further procure us a free (or forced) resort to the two famous ports of the Gulph of Mexico. Viz. the Havana and Vera Cruz." (*Second voyage of La Salle*, p. 188.) And we may see by the quantities of gold and other Spanish commodities, taken in their ships from the Mississippi in the last war, that they have not only found a way to the Spanish ports from thence already, but likewise to the mines of Mexico; to which they have an open road, and a secure trade commonly followed by them from the Mississippi. The French no sooner went to this river after the peace of Utrecht, than the first thing they attempted was this trade to the Spanish mines. For this purpose, they immediately sent a ship to Vera Cruz, and a convoy over land to the mines of St. Barbe. — It is but two hundred and eighty leagues from New Orleans to those mines; which is but a small way for the French to go for gold and silver, when they go so constantly all over North-America upwards of one thousand leagues for a few beaver skins — This is a grand object which the French have in view, which makes them so intent upon securing all those vast countries they call Louisiana; which not only leads to, but must command the adjacent mines of Mexico — It plainly appears from hence, as well as from all other accounts, that their views are not only the security of Canada, but of Louisiana, which must give them the command of the Spanish mines, whenever they find it proper and convenient; besides the whole trade and commerce of that continent in time. — This their settlement on the Mississippi, if not taken notice of, is likely to turn to as great an account to them in time, as they conceived it might in 1719. They are not only convenient here to go to the mines of Mexico to which they have a good road already opened by land, and begin to carry on a considerable trade there; but if they encrease and strengthen here, as they must soon do in so fine and extensive a country, while they have such a superior force adjoining to this in their islands, they must by means of these two so easily joined together, and constantly supporting one another, soon be able to reap all the profits of the Spanish treasures in America, if not to seize them; a thing that all Europe is concerned in surely, as well as Britain! — All those things have been meditated for many years, but they are now come to a crisis, and we must prevent them *now or never*. If the French have over-run all those countries, and made themselves masters

And here I cannot help reflecting on the amazing conduct of our ministry, in not attacking this colony, which *at present* is so far from being formidable. It ought certainly to have been the very first object of our attempts after Canada was in our possession. A great force at an immense expence, (much superior to what would have been required for the conquest of Louisiana) is gone against Martinico, which is not of such consequence to us. General Amherst might have conveyed his whole army down the Ohio and Mississippi, with as much ease as he proceeded through a much worse and more impenetrable country, by the way of Crown Point by water to Montreal. It would have been a most remarkable advantage, to have been able to proceed by water for upwards of three thousand miles on such an expedition; and the country is so very fruitful, and abounds so with deer and tame cattle, that an army might be maintained in it perhaps easier than in any other country in the world. But there are many other reasons which must be evident to the reader without reciting, that prove very clearly how ill our ministry judged in preferring an expedition against Martinico, to one against New Orleans.

The first article of the several memorials between the courts of Great-Britain and France, which I inserted above, also ceded to France a share of the Newfoundland fishery, in consideration of Dunkirk's being demolished, according to the treaty of Utrecht.

If the same ministry who made that peace and also that of Aix, had again proposed such an article as this, I should not have been surprized; but that a man of our Patriot Minister's abilities, should give up the interest of the nation in a point of such immense importance, I own is something odd, or at least it appears so at first sight, though this paradox as well as many others, might perhaps be easily reconciled with common sense. The vast consequence of this fishery should undoubtedly have prevented our ministry, from ceding any port to France in these parts. We offered them the island of St. Peter; this spot which has a convenient port, is very finely situated for the cod fishery, as well as any point of Newfoundland, and they might undoubtedly make it of as much consequence to them for fishing as ever Cape Breton was, but this island is not the only ces-

masters of them already, only with a handful of men, how will they ever be rooted out of them, when they come to be well secured and fortified in them, the first thing they will do without doubt; and to encrease and multiply as they must do in such fruitful countries? It will then be in vain to say, that Britain ought to vindicate its rights to those countries; or that Spain is endangered by them. They must both submit to the fate they have brought upon themselves, if they suffer the French thus to over-run North-America, and to secure and fortify themselves in it. We never see them part with a place they once get sure footing in; nor give up or neglect such advantages as those here represented, the Spanish treasures in America." See *The Contest in America*, written by Dr. Mitchell; who perfectly understood the importance of these countries.

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sion made by us, for the right which the French had by the peace of Utrecht, is confirmed of fishing and drying their fish on the coasts of Newfoundland *. Now it is very plain from the situation of this island, and the part of the coast of Newfoundland which is for their use, that they might, and must necessarily have raised as great a fishery as ever the possession of Louisburg gave them; for the reader is greatly mistaken, if he imagines that that town assisted their fishing in any other respect, than as a port for their ships to rendezvous at. St. Peters island is as well situated as Cape Breton, and they doubtless, if ever they come to be possessed of it, will make it as great a nursery as the other.

The value of their cod fishery before we drove them quite out of it was immense. It was unbounded, and inestimable, annually employing at least a thousand sail, from two hundred to four hundred tons and twenty thousand men. In the year 1730, there was a computation made of two hundred and twenty thousand quintils of fish at Merseilles only, for a market, and *communibus annis* they cured above five millions of quintals. How dangerous a nursery of seamen has been and ever will be while in their possession is very obvious, and yet this was only their *share*; much greater indeed than ours. If we were to keep the whole of this fishery in our own hands at a peace we should gain annually two millions of pounds sterling, by the lowest computations; for it occasions a consumption of manufactures greater than what can at first be conceived. It would not only be depriving our enemies of so important a branch of their trade, but would abridge the revenue of France by lessening the consumption of French salt, the profit of which is solely in the crown, and more than half of

* The thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht: "The island called Newfoundland with the adjacent islands shall from this time forward belong of right wholly to Britain; and to that end the town and fortress of Placentia, and whatever other places in the said island in possession of the French, shall be yielded and given up, within seven months from the exchange of the ratification of this treaty, or sooner if possible by the most Christian King, to those who have a commission from the Queen of Great-Britain, for that purpose. Nor shall the most Christian King, his heirs and successors, or any of their subjects at any time hereafter lay claim to any right to the said island and islands, or to any part of it or them. Moreover it shall not be lawful for the subjects of France, to fortify any place in the said island of Newfoundland, or to erect any buildings there besides stages made of boards, and huts necessary and usual for drying of fish, or to resort to the said island beyond the time necessary for fishing and drying of fish. But it shall be allowed to the subjects of France, to catch fish and to dry them on land in that part only, and in no other besides that, of the said island of Newfoundland, which stretches from the place called Cape Bonavista to the northern point of the said island, and from thence running down by the western side, reaches as far as the place called point Riche."—The clause in the British Memorial is, "Saving always the privilege granted by the thirteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht to the subjects of France, to fish and dry their codfish on a part specified of the banks of Newfoundland, which privilege is proposed to be renewed to France as aforesaid."

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which that was made in the kingdom was employed in this fishery. At the same time the revenue from our own salt trade, which stands engaged for a considerable part of the national debt, may be made to encrease in proportion as that of France is lessened. Were we possessed of this fishery alone, it might be an eternal nursery of thirty, forty, or perhaps fifty thousand seamen, since nobody can tell the improvements which would result from the sole possession.

Such is the invaluable consideration which we offered in the late negotiation for the demolition of Dunkirk! If the Minister who offered to make such a sacrifice had not been the favourite of the people, he would have been regarded from this alone, as the enemy of this country. It may perhaps be said, that Dunkirk is an object of real fear in the English, but I can allow no such thing; formerly it was feared much but never with any grounds, and a demand originally to demolish it was unjust and absurd; we have just as much right to make the demolition of Brest an article in a peace, as we had to expect that of Dunkirk at first. But if this place was of such great consequence as some very obstinately insist it is, sure it can never be allowed of so much importance, as even the tenth part of the Newfoundland fishery; France contains many Dunkirks, but she possesses only one fishery. If we examine any list of the prizes made during the course of the present war by the French, we shall not find that a large proportion of them was carried into Dunkirk; many other ports of France have been more fatal to our trade, and particularly Bayonne: why don't we demand that the harbour of this nest of privateers be demolished? This absurd conduct is founded merely on the French principle *the law of convenience*. As to invasions, we have little or no reason to fear Dunkirk, (nor indeed all the ports of France) on that account, for all the expence that ever was, or ever can be laid out on it, will never make it capable of being a first rate harbour; and if it could admit very large ships of war its situation renders it very improper for an invasion, for no port can be fit for that, unless it is very near the part of the enemies coast they would invade. Now from Dunkirk a fleet must sail a considerable way before it can land troops with safety: all our Kentish and southern coasts quite to Portsmouth are so excessively strong, and the country so deep and impenetrable, that an enemy could not even land; or if they were landed, make any progress. For these reasons the French will never fit out an expedition fleet from this port, but only make a great parade of naval preparations at it to frighten the English: if it was really formidable to the greatest degree, if its harbour was as extensive and deep as those of Brest or Toulon, yet we should have no more reason to be afraid of it than of those towns; much less to give such an immense consideration for its demolition. I have endeavoured to prove that the French by means of the possession of St. Peters island, and the confirmation of part of the thirteenth article
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of the treaty of Utrecht, would soon have revived their fishery, and raised it to as great a height as ever : such an accession of wealth would soon have enabled them to render many of their ports more truly formidable to us than Dunkirk. Sure we ought more to fear a nursery of twenty or thirty thousand French seamen, than a paltry French port ! By the cod-fishery they will be enabled, more perhaps than by any other branch of trade, to revive their navy ; and I believe every unprejudiced person will agree with me, that we have far greater reason to fear an accession of naval power to France, than any single port in that kingdom. All the fortifications in Europe cannot make a French port formidable ; trade alone can raise a navy ; and if we had taken care to prevent them from raising a trade, we should never have had the least occasion to fear French ports.

The ignorant may fancy that as long as Louisburg is demolished, and Cape Breton is ours, we have no reason to fear the power of France in those seas. But nothing can be more absurd ; it was not Louisburg that was of such bad consequence to us, but the flourishing state of the French fishery, which depended merely on places to dry their fish on, and erect warehouses. The fortifications had nothing to do with the fishery, and the want of them could never have prevented its encrease ; we offered them an island for their necessary purposes as well situated as Cape Breton, and much nearer the great fishing bank. Here they would soon have carried on as flourishing a fishery as ever they did from Louisburg, and consequently would have raised by natural means a vast number of sailors, who would always find constant employment. Can Dunkirk be reckoned an equivalent for a share of this trade ? And a share unlimited, for the French by our proposals might have employed ten thousand sail in it, if they pleased. In short, no arguments in the world, can possibly convince the knowing reader, that Dunkirk can be considered as a proper equivalent for a share of the cod-fishery. This is one of those articles which ought to have been entirely in our favour. But when the British Ministry were so impolitic, as at once to offer an equivalent for demolishing that port, we could not but expect, that something of forty times its value would be given for it. No peace should have been thought of that left the French at liberty to employ a single ship in this trade, for a treaty could not contain an article of greater importance : Instead of seeing the great consequence of it, our Ministry in *their very first Memorial*, offered to yield a share to France in consideration of this trifling equivalent.——The next cession to France, is the islands of Guardaloupe and Marigalante : In the first memorial of France it is proposed in

The 3d, 4th, and 5th ARTICLES.

“ That France shall restore to England the island of Minorca——In consideration of this cession, England shall restore Guardaloupe and Marigalante. The

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neutral islands to remain so." In the British Memorial it was answered that, "The island of Minorca should be immediately restored—France shall immediately restore and evacuate the conquests she has made over his Majesty's allies in Germany, that is to say, of all the estates and countries appertaining to the Landgrave of Hesse, to the Duke of Brunswick, and to the Electorate of Hanover; and of all the places and territories belonging to the King of Prussia, in possession of the arms of France. In a word, France shall make a general evacuation of all her conquests on the side of Hesse, Westphalia, and its countries. —The King of Great-Britain on his part agrees to surrender to his Most Christian Majesty, 1. Belleisle, 2. Guardaloupe and Marigalante.

I have thrown these several articles together, as they plainly have a connection with each other. It is evident that the point of importance here is the restitution of Guardaloupe. The three principal points that were to be discussed in this treaty were, North-America, the cod-fishery, and the sugar trade; these are all of far greater importance, I apprehend than any thing else. In respect to North-America, our Ministry neglected to *secure our colonies*: they gave up a share of the fishery; and we shall now find, they would have restored Guardaloupe. It has often been said, that the ends which a nation ought to have answered, in making a peace are, 1. the thing for which the war was properly and justly begun; 2. An indemnification for the expences of carrying it on. We went to war for *security for our colonies*; and none of our conquests would by any means be a tolerable indemnification, except, the cod-fishery, and the sugar trade. Canada upon the plan of the late negotiation, would have been of little consequence besides that of adding to the security of our *northern* colonies; but if Louisiana had been ceded to us, *the whole* would have paid *all* the expences of the war—The cod-fishery we should soon have lost, and we should have restored Guardaloupe.

Every understanding reader must confess, that the grand point which we should have had in view in a peace with France, must be, to ruin their trade by cutting off its sources. It will not be difficult to show that the sugar trade is one of the principal of these; that nation had carried this branch of their commerce to such an amazing and formidable height, that they had before we took Guardaloupe beat us out of all the markets of Europe; this increase of their trade was owing chiefly to the possession of Guardaloupe. About the time of the treaty of Utrecht, we supplied the greatest part of the sugar consumption throughout Europe. France, far from contending with us in the foreign market, took from us great part of what she used at home. From the year 1715 to 1719, we exported one year with another eighteen thousand, five hundred and eighty hogsheads of sugar. From 1719 to 1722, we fell to less than half; for we
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sent abroad but nine thousand and sixty four *communibus annis*. We continued regularly on the decrease to 1739, in which year our sugar export had fallen to four thousand and seventy eight hogsheds. Since that time it has fallen almost to nothing. Now let us turn the other side, and view the sugar trade of France since the same period, the treaty of Utrecht. At that time the French exported no sugars. But mark the revolution. In 1740, when the British trade in that article was in a manner annihilated; France after serving her home consumption at a very easy rate, exported no less than eighty thousand hogsheds of sugar, which, with the gains of the commission, &c. was reputed to be worth to France more than a million sterling; to employ forty thousand ton of shipping and four thousand seamen, solely in bringing it from the West-Indies to Europe*. Surely these facts tell us in the clearest manner the necessity of keeping possession of Guardaloupe; but I have not insisted on a multitude of other articles, which this island produces in great quantities, besides sugar, and which are of immense value, and add a vast increase to its trade: there is no necessity of being exact in such representations as these; the outlines of the picture are too striking to need the assistance of colouring; it must be allowed by every body that this island is of prodigious importance; that its trade is one of the principle branches of the French commerce; and that it, consequently, is one of the sources of their naval power.

If these facts are allowed, as sure they must be, I think it must appear evident to every Briton, that we ought to have insisted on the possession of Guardaloupe, as the cod-fishery was to have been restored, and *Frenchmen left in North-America*. By giving up this island we should give with it a vast accession of naval power to our dangerous rivals, and without keeping any thing ourselves that will form a ballance to what we give up. Let us but reflect on the flourishing state of the French commerce at the breaking out of the present war, and we shall be convinced of the necessity there is for us to curtail it. This war succeeded only a five years peace, a very short time to revive a trade, and raise a powerful navy. Yet we found their commerce rose to a prodigious height, and a navy that rendered France formidable even to the first maritime power in the universe. At the conclusion of the peace of Utrecht, the trade of France was in a deplorable condition; she had not then five hundred vessels of all sorts in the world. At the beginning of the last war, but thirty years after, they had eighteen hundred. Their losses in that war were very great, and yet their losses in this shew, that in a very little time they have more than repaired them. Wherever the vital principal

* For more of this argument see, "Remarks on a Letter to two Great Men." p. 32.

subsists in full vigor, wounds are soon healed *. Such quick renovations plainly tell us the importance of their colonies, and among the rest their sugar ones: if these are the sources of that power which enables them to kindle up such violent flames in every part of the world, sure we ought to be particularly careful at a peace to deprive them of as many of their colonies as we possibly can; and tho' an attempt to keep every thing we have conquer'd perhaps would be unsuccessful, yet we certainly ought never to make one, that did not leave us in possession of a considerable indemnification for our enormous expences. Nothing that we should have kept, (by this negotiation) could be regarded even as a reasonable one, except those articles which I have shown would have been given up to the French. This conduct in our Ministry was certainly against the interest of their country; but what shall we say to those infatuated men who had rather have any peace than none at this time, and who think our great Commoner did not make concessions enough! † ‡

I have here endeavoured to show the importance of Guardaloupe, and consequently, of the neutral islands, considered merely with respect to their own value, to either nation: but sure the reader must perceive that Guardaloupe and Belleisle in the British Memorial, are supposed to be equivalent considerations for the French evacuating Germany; for after the article which respects that evacuation, the next begins, "*The King of Great-Britain on his part agrees*" to the restoring those two islands. Surely any Briton zealous for the interest of his country, must feel an honest indignation at thus seeing the honor, as well as most important concerns of this kingdom, offered to be sacrificed for the sake of a parcel of petty princes in Germany! We are neither bound by gratitude nor honor, to insist on the French evacuating the countries of these people, we are pleased to call our allies. The reader should remember that they are no further our allies than by letting troops to us, and in the treaties for those troops we are bound to pay them very sufficient subsidies, but no mention is made that we, at a peace, are to insist on the French quitting their country. For the sake of subsidies they run all the hazard of ruining their dominions, and by their persisting still to let out their troops, it is very plain they are well paid for them, notwith-

* Account of the European Settlements in America. Vol. II. p. 22.

† The D—e of B—— has spoke in p———t warmly for a peace, *any*, rather than none.

‡ Extract from a memorial of the deputies of the French commerce, to their royal council 1701. ——"The navigation of France owes all its increase and splendor to the commerce of its sugar islands, and that it cannot be kept up and enlarged otherwise than by this commerce. 'Tis beyond all doubt that this commerce is more beneficial to the state than all others, (of long voyages) that are driven by the French."

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standing their country is ruined by the French. Of what consequence is it to Great-Britain, whether the Landgraviate of Hesse be possessed by French troops or not; or whether Wesel and Guelders, and other countries belonging to the King of Prussia, are left in their hands; for by the several memorials and letters, it is plain that the French offered to withdraw all assistance of any kind from the Empress Queen, provided we did the same by the King of Prussia; and this plainly shows, that we might have left that monarch's territories in Westphalia in their hands, under the name of the Empress Queen, without the least endangering him. But what can we say to this article, when we see the island of Guardaloupe ceded to France on account of her evacuating them? Would not the interest of this nation have been sold, and sacrificed, without the least shadow of right or reason? In short, Guardaloupe is of such immense importance to us, and the German territories of so little consequence, that I cannot help being amazed at the infatuation of giving the one for the other. What may we not expect in a future negotiation, in case bad fortune attends the King of Prussia? We have just as much reason to give back every conquest we have made to procure him good terms of peace, as we have to restore any one, on account of his dominions in Westphalia. The whole value of those territories for which we were to cede Guardaloupe to France, would not amount to the fortieth part of the value of that island. Such are the politics of our Patriot Minister! As to the value of Minorca and Belleisle, I shall not enquire into them, but believe they may be to *France* on a par; they are not so important as the other articles of this negotiation.

The ninth ARTICLE of the British answer to the ultimatum of France.

“ With regard to the succour to be afforded to the King of Prussia on the part of the British crown as an auxiliary, after the conclusion of the separate peace between Great-Britain and France, his Majesty remains in the same inflexible resolution, which he declared at the first overture of the present negotiation, that he will never desist from giving constant succour to the King of Prussia as an auxiliary *with efficacy and good faith*, in order to attain the salutary end of a general pacification in Germany. With this view, his Majesty, far from proposing to leave France at liberty to send armies into Silesia, *without being limited to the number stipulated in her actual engagements with the court of Vienna*, (a circumstance not to be found in any part of the ultimatum of England) has uniformly declared, as the thirteenth article of the said ultimatum professes, that Great-Britain and France, shall be at liberty to support their respective allies as auxiliaries in their particular contest for the recovery of Silesia, according to the engagements

gements entered into by each crown. The King declares at the same time, that his Majesty has neither the intention, nor the authority, to take upon him to inhibit and forbid any foreign troops from entering into the service and pay of the King of Prussia; however his majesty might be inclined to consent not to furnish, but by means of subsidy, those supplies which Great-Britain shall judge convenient to grant his Prussian Majesty, pursuant to her engagements."

I have given this article at full length, as it shows clearly that the British Ministry were determined not to renounce the Prussian cause on any account whatever. I shall not enter into the old enquiry concerning the expediency of a German war, as I think it a dispute which common sense must have determined in the minds of the unprejudiced long ago; there is no necessity to revive this, but we had no occasion to proceed in any unfair way with Prussia, for if France would renounce her engagements with the Empress Queen, we might with honor do the same by the King of Prussia; that the French court would have done this, is plain from the following——

"Since the Memorial of the propositions from France was formed, and at the instant that the courier was ready to set out for London, the King received the consent of the Empress Queen to a separate peace with England, but upon two conditions :

1. To keep possession of the countries belonging to the king of Prussia.
2. That it shall be stipulated that the king of Great-Britain, neither in his capacity of king or elector, shall afford any succour, either in troops, or of any kind whatever to the king of Prussia; and that his Britannic majesty will undertake that the Hanoverian, Hessian, Brunswickian, and the other auxiliaries in alliance with Hanover, shall not join the forces of the king of Prussia, in like manner as France shall engage on her part, not to yield succour of any kind to the Empress Queen nor her allies.

Both these conditions appear so natural and equitable in themselves, that his majesty could not do otherwise than acquiesce in them, and he hopes that the king of Great-Britain will be ready to adopt them."

It appears very plainly from hence, that the peace between Great-Britain and France is never likely to be concluded to the advantage of either nation, if we do not make the same concession with regard to our German allies as the French. It may seem strange that our *Patriot* Minister, who makes such prodigious offers where they tend to the destruction and ruin of this kingdom, should be so very unreasonable in respect to the affairs of Germany. I say unreasonable; for we are never likely to have a peace, if the respective German interests are not separated from those of Great-Britain and France in a negotiation. This conduct certainly appears very odd, but our surprize surely will cease, when we remem-

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ber that the same man who would have sacrificed the interest of this nation for the sake of foreign ones, is he, who once railed most violently at continental connections under whatever circumstances, and afterwards adopted them with more zeal than any minister that ever preceded him.

The Tenth ARTICLE of the last British Memorial.

“ With regard to the captures made after the commencement of hostilities and before the declaration of war, the king continues of opinion, that such a demand on the part of France, is neither just nor maintainable according to the most incontestible principles of the right of war and nations.”

This article was certainly maintained with commendable resolution by the British Ministry; and the unreasonableness of the French in demanding the restitution, was founded in nothing but injustice and contempt of the law of nations. They were the aggressors in the present war, and also began hostilities, by invading countries which either belonged to us or ought to have been regarded as neutral, in America. Now if our enemy attacks us in one country, are we not at liberty by the law of nations to resent such conduct by attacking them in another: the forms of declarations of war, can with reason be regarded as nothing but forms; essences are much superior; In fact the French declared war by attacking us in America. It is very plain from Rouille's letter to Mr. Fox in 1756, that the French themselves thought war might be declared without regarding the forms of it; he concludes his letter with these words, “ But if contrary to all hopes, the king of England refuses what the king demands, his majesty will *regard this denial of justice as the most authentic declaration of war*, and as a formed design in the court of London, to disturb the peace of Europe.”—— Might not we with the same justice regard the denials of France to restore their encroachments in America, as *an authentic declaration of war*? Certainly: and they, by those encroachments did in reality declare war against us. It is no wonder that the French ministry in the memorial which they delivered expressly on this subject, should slur over the imaginary difference between commencing hostilities and declaring war; they say, “ It is not necessary to contest the principle, that the right of exercising hostilities does not always result from the formality of a declaration of war.”——What tottering foundations must an argument have that begins with such a falshood; it was very necessary to begin the negotiation on this point, with such an enquiry, because the determination must necessarily conclude the debate for one party or the other. If war is declared, not by words but by actions prior to words, the answer is evidently for us; but if the declaration of war is the form, and not the commencement of hostilities, why then

then 'tis as evidently for the French. The principal argument which the French give us in defence of their demand of restitution is founded on the nineteenth article of the treaty of Utrecht, by which it is agreed that in case a new war breaks out, the ships, &c. on both sides in the dominions of either party, shall not be confiscated till six months from the date of the rupture *, but in answer to this we may reasonably alledge that the French had broke the treaty (and that of Aix la Chapelle) and rendered them no longer binding, by their encroachments in America. According to the principle advanced by France, one nation is obliged by the letter of a treaty to remain peaceable, while the adverse nation has broke and infringed it in more particulars than one. At this day no treaties are binding between France and England, because the two nations are at war; and treaties, by the law of nations, are rendered of no effect when broke in any material particular. Nothing is clearer than that the French began the war by commencing hostilities on countries which, as I said before, either belonged to us, or were neutral; such a conduct was declaring war against us as effectually as if the forms were observed, and consequently, all former treaties ceased to be binding.

The eleventh article of the answer of the British Court to the memorial of French propositions.

“ As the indispensable care which is due from his Majesty to his people, and the just and invincible motives which concern the preservation and security of his kingdoms, authorized by the most formal stipulations of solemn treaties (*viz.* those of Radstadt and the barrier) and even by the express and irrevocable conditions of the cession of the Low-Countries, will not allow France to retain possession of Ostend and Newport, the two places aforesaid shall be evacuated without delay by the French garrisons; it is for this reason declared that the restitutions spoken of in the preceding articles of this memorial, and particularly the convention which is to be framed and regulated with respect to the Indies, cannot take place till the aforesaid evacuation of Ostend and Newport shall be faithfully executed.

Eleventh A R T I C L E of the last British Memorial.

Concerning the evacuations of Ostend and Newport the King cannot but refer to the most express and irrevocable stipulation of the most solemn treaties, and expressed in the eleventh Article of the Ultimatum of Great-Britain, as also to his declaration relative to that subject, and his Majesty relies on the sincerity of the declaration on the part of France; that is to say, that *the intention*

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* See Appendix.

of his most Christian Majesty never was to keep possession of the aforesaid places after the return of peace."

What a farce is exhibited in these two articles! *Indispensible care*, and *invincible motives* shine forth in the first, with such a blaze that one would think the very existence of England depended on these two towns; in answer to this pressing demand, the French king assures us he never intended to keep possession of them; and our patriot Minister gives up in the record, this point to the word of a French king. In reading the first of these articles, I own, I was greatly pleased to find the honour and interest of the nation so well understood, and so resolutely asserted, on a point of such great importance. But when I found that such a pompous rout had been made merely as a puff to evaporate in smoke, my indignation was moved; and it cannot but be supposed that every true Briton will regard such contradictory sentiments with the scorn they deserve. Ought a Minister to confide in the word of a French ministry (a word seldom, if ever, given but with design to be broken) on a point which so nearly concerned the *indispensible care* of a monarch for his people, and the *invincible motives* of their security;—ought such a word, I say, to be the dependence of that people on so important a point? If the evacuation of these towns is of real importance, as it certainly is, surely we should have had something to rely on besides this very doubtful word. In the first Article which I have quoted it is declared contrary to treaties that the French should be in possession of them. Was it not also contrary to those treaties that they should *get* possession of them? If it was contrary, did not the French break them when their troops marched in? We see therefore that the very cause of such an article as this existing, is a breach of faith in the French; and yet we in the very same breath take their word again in the very same case!

But the evacuation of these towns is of real importance to Great-Britain, and of far too much consequence to be left to the word of the French king in a treaty of peace. One would think it ignorance, or wilful over-sight in our ministry not to take any notice of the French troops being in possession of many other towns in the Austrian Netherlands, also contrary to treaty; they certainly have the same right to garrison every town in Flanders as well as Ostend and Newport. This country, which is in a manner in their possession, is that important spot for which we, among so many other nations, have expended such rivers of blood and mines of gold. It has been one of the principal objects of British politicks for above an hundred years past; our monarchs have taken the field themselves in its defence, and to keep it out of the hands of France. Yet our sublime ministry in the late negotiation had too exalted notions to trouble their heads about it, but thought they did mighty matters in thunder-

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ing out some *smoke balls of pompous phrases*, and then taking the French king's word for our security!

We cannot reasonably wonder at the unconcern of the Empress Queen about these her territories, when we consider that they bring her in *no revenue*; the produce of all the taxes being spent upon the country and in keeping a court at Brussels. But to France this country is of immense importance, the situation of it is the most advantageous in Europe, and by stretching along against our coast, and bordering on the Dutch, would answer their designs completely. If they were in possession of it they might at any time over-run Holland, which would transfer to them an immense trade at once, and endanger the liberties of all Europe. The real importance of this country was always understood by British Ministers till now; and the French very well know of what consequence it is to them. In the last war it was debated in the French king's cabinet, whether they should not abandon their navy and colonies to their fate, and aim all their endeavours at the conquest of Flanders and Holland, by that means regaining their former naval power, and adding a vast increase to it. We very well know that this project, had it not been over-ruled, might have been executed with great ease; the Dutch now, are far from being the people they were; their trade, and consequently their riches, have been above fifty years greatly on the decline, and at home they are so weak that a French army might penetrate with little or no resistance even to Amsterdam itself. This event may one day or other happen, and what fatal consequences it would have, must be evident at the first thought. Nothing could prove a tolerable remedy for such a misfortune but Great-Britain's immediately attacking France, and never making peace till she had reduced the united French and Dutch trade to a medium with her own; if we consider the long train of bad consequences that must inevitably attend such an affair surely we must be surprised at the negligence of our ministry, in looking so tamely on the French being possessed of Ostend and Newport, the keys of Flanders; and on their astonishing credulity in taking the French king's word for their evacuation. If the French were possessed of these important countries, besides the vast accession of trade, manufactures, and revenue, their situation would absolutely give them the command of Germany and Denmark, and, in some measure, of the north, such a vast conquest, (and how easy might it be made!) would well repay France for every conquest it was possible for our fleets to make from them, and they would soon possess a navy superior to ours. But is it plain that the British ministry seemed to know the importance of these two towns? Is it not also evident that they gave up a point of such great consequence to Britain, on the *word* of the French king?

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The Thirteenth A R T I C L E of the British Memorial.

“ The treaty concluded between Messrs Saunders and Godcheu cannot be admitted as the basis of the re-establishment of the peace in Asia, because that provisional treaty has had no consequences, and because those provisions are by no means applicable to the present state of affairs in the Indies, by the final reduction of the possessions and settlements of the French company in the Indies ; but as the perfect and final settlement with regard to that country can only be made in conformity to certain rights absolutely appertaining to the English company, and as the King cannot justly dispose of their rights without their consent, it must necessarily be left to the companies of the two nations to adjust the terms of accommodation and reconciliation, according to those rules of reason and justice which the state and circumstances of their affairs may require, and mutually point out, provided nevertheless that those conditions are not repugnant to the designs and equitable intentions of their sovereigns for the peace and reconciliation of the two crowns.”

The French ministry immediately accepted this proposal, and no wonder ; since the spirit of it is exactly adapted to the French maxim of negotiating and concluding treaties, the leaving as much as possible to after-determination, and the decisions of companies and commissaries. The least penetration will inform us that nothing would be easier for the French than to leave affairs in the East-Indies in such a doubtful manner, that they might occasion another war at a more promising period for France. This was the case with North-America at the treaties of Utrecht and Aix. The limits were left undetermined to be settled by commissaries, and the consequence was, the present war. Thus in the East-Indies how easy would it be for France by some seeming advantage for our company, to gain their point in letting some article be left doubtful : afterwards, when they had a mind to renew the war there would be a disputable point, negotiations would be begun, and the conclusion, a war : it may be said that the East-India trade is of no advantage to us, and consequently that we should not engage in one for the sake of the company ; whether the trade is of so much advantage as it would be if laid open, I shall not enquire, but that it is of very great advantage is certain, the contrary prejudiced opinion is now fully exploded ; almost all the nations of Europe are so fully persuaded of the importance of this trade, that they either have, or had companies ; but the force we have always kept in these parts, in time of war, is an evident proof that our ministry always thought this trade very well worth defending : Can it

therefore be supposed that we should ever suffer the French to make encroachments on us and not think of repelling them? A ministry might possibly be so tame spirited; but it is to be hoped that the voice of the nation would be too loud to be easily silenced. By reason of the absolute government of France the French East-India company would be mere commissaries appointed by the French ministry, and consequently their ends would first be answered. In short, this nation has suffered far too much by such means to leave the decision of any points whatever to companies or commissaries; if we have an inclination to give our enemies an opportunity of beginning a new war in a few years, with an appearance of justice, we cannot take a more effectual step to bring about such a design.

I have now gone through the most important articles of the several memorials which passed between the two courts*; I have endeavoured to prove, not from prejudice, (below the character of a Briton,) or declamation, but by facts and cool argument, that had a peace been concluded, on the terms offered by our *patriot* minister, it would have proved an extreme bad one; and been attended with many of those bad consequences which we have so lately experienced, resulting from former treaties. I have shewn (or aimed at it at least) that the object of the present war was the *security* of our American colonies; and that this end would not have been answered; by leaving the limits of Louisiana and our settlements undetermined; that we should not have kept a *reasonable* indemnification for our immense expences, as we offered to restore the French a share in the Newfoundland fishery, and Guardaloupe, &c. and that in consequence of these two points the peace must have been very bad. I have further endeavoured to prove, that such a peace must have endangered Great-Britain, from the sentiments of our Minister himself, by neglecting the evacuation of the Low-Countries by the French troops. And, lastly, that the affairs of the East-Indies would necessarily have been left in such a doubtful manner, that the French at any time might make it the reason of entering into a new, and perhaps to appearance, just war. And I may add that the negotiation was carried on upon a principle which will at any time prevent our having a tolerable peace, that of connecting German disputes with the immediate ones of France and England.— If these assertions are founded in facts, as I flatter myself the reader will find they are, surely we may reasonably conclude that all the conquests which we made under the administration of the late Minister, would not near balance the mischiefs and fatal consequences that must inevitably have attended such a disadvantageous peace.

* I have taken no notice of the Spanish Memorial, as the affair was dropped by the French, but our Minister, in respect to his answer, behaved with honour and resolution.

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And now who can reflect on the popularity of a man that was so near being fatal to the interests of his country, without amazement at the infatuation of a deluded people? What opinion ought Britons to entertain of a minister who involved his country in expences unknown before his administration; who run his country above fourscore millions in debt, to dig a grave for British soldiers in the deserts of Germany. What other end would have been answered by those immense expences, had a peace been concluded on these terms? Surely this nation ought at least to consider the merits of a man who is a candidate for their favour before they pronounce positively for him. We were blessed, it is true, under our late Minister's administration, with many glorious conquests; and for the share he had in these events we owe him great praise; but is that saying that this Minister can never do any thing to forfeit our good opinion? Had he concluded a peace on the terms I have mentioned (and it is plain he would have done it) he ought justly to be considered in the very contrary light from what he was before. I have already answered the objection that might be made to my argument from the French court's refusing these terms, and shewn that they never thought of making peace, but only of penetrating into the secrets of our cabinet, to discover what hopes they had of procuring better terms than these. And we can make little doubt but that their end is answered, and that they will be able to make a most excellent peace, for themselves, now they have found out the principles on which we shall negotiate. What advantage can we possibly expect from a treaty that is at once to comprehend the interests of Germany and Great-Britain?

But I shall not trouble the reader with entering further into any reflections on a subject which cannot be considered without disgust; I shall only observe that we ought not to be so extravagant in our praise of a Minister, who now has fully convinced the unprejudiced that he no longer deserves our good opinion; that we have no reason to regret his removal from the administration of affairs, *if he would have had* the concluding of a peace. We have for several years condemned the ministers who formed the treaties of Utrecht and Aix, but we give loud acclamations of praise to our *late patriot* for his negotiations; although there is not a single fault to be found in the former treaties, but parallel ones will appear in the latter. —

A P P E N D I X.

Numb. I.

AS I founded part of my argument on the quick renovation of the naval strength of France after the late war, I shall here present the reader with a genuine list of the French navy, as it was in the year 1755, only six years after the peace of Aix, by which it will appear how soon their naval power was restored.

N ^o	Ships Names	Guns	Where built	Age
1	Royal Louis	120	Rochfort	1751
	Ocean	84		1756
	D. de Bourgogne	80	Brest	1751
	Formidable	80		1750
5	Foudroyant	80	Toulon	
	Soleil Royale	80	Brest	1749
	Tonant	80	Toulon	1743
	Orient	80		
	Algonquin	74	Canada	1753
10	Bien Aimé	74		
	Centaur	74	Toulon	1756
	Conquerant	74	Toulon	1746
	Courageux	74	Brest	1743
	Couronne	74	Brest	1749
15	Defenseur	74	Brest	1754
	Diademe	74	Toulon	1756
	Entreprenant	74	Brest	1754
	Experience	74		
	Florissant	74		1752
20	Glorieux	74		
	Guerriere	74	Toulon	1750
				Hector

N ^o .	Ships Names	Guns	Where built	Age
	Hector	74	Rochfort	1750
	Heros	74	Brest	1752
	Intrepide	74	Toulon	1747
25	Magnifique	74	Brest	1749
	Minotaur	74		
	Palmier	74	Brest	1752
	Protecteur	74		
	Prudent	74	Rochfort	1754
30	Redoubtable	74	Toulon	1750
	Robuste	74		
	Sceptre	74	Brest	1747
	Souveraine	74	Toulon	1756
	Superbe	74	Brest	
35	Temmeraire	74	Toulon	1759
	Thesée	74	Brest	
	La Vainqueur	64		
	La Fortune	64		
	Zodiaque	74		
40	Dauphine Royal	70	Brest	1735
	Ferme	70	Toulon	1722
	Juste	70	Rochfort	1724
	Achilles	64	Toulon	1747
	Active	64	Brest	
45	Alcide	64		
	Altia	64	Toulon	
	St. Anne	64	Genoa	
	C. de Provence	64		
	Bellicieux	64	Toulon	
50	Bienfaisant	64	Brest	1752
	Bertine	64		1760
	Bizarre	64		1751
	Brilliant	64		
	Capricieux	64	Rochfort	1753
55	Celebre	64	Toulon	
	Content	64	Toulon	1747
	Dragon	64	Brest	
	L' Harlaem	64		
	Eveillé	64	Rochfort	1752
				Fontafque

N ^o	Ships Names	Guns	Where built	Age
60	Fontasque	64	Toulon	1756
	Hardi	64	Toulon	
	Hercules	64	Brest	1748
	Illustre	64	Brest	1750
	Inflexible	64	Rochfort	
65	Lion	64	Toulon	1751
	Lys	64	Brest	1746
	Modeste	64	Toulon	1751
	Northumberland	64	England	1744
	St. Louis	60		
70	Opiniatre	64	Brest	1750
	Orphée	64	Toulon	1749
	Prothée	64	Brest	
	Raisnable	64	Brest	
	Sage	64	Toulon	1751
75	Solide	64	Toulon	
	Solitaire	64		
	Sphinx	64		
	Triton	64	Toulon	1747
	Vaillaint	64	Toulon	
80	D. d'Orleans	60		
	Vengeur	64		
	Verge du Eofair	64	Genoa	
	Verge du S ^r .	64	Genoa	
	Leopard	64	Toulon	1720
85	St Michelle	60	Brest	1738
	Warwick		England	
	L'Agile	54	Rochfort	1750
	Alcion	54	Toulon	1724
	Amphion	56	Rochfort	1748
90	Arc-en-ciel	50		
	Fier	54	Toulon	
	Greenwich	50	England	
	Himptain	54	Toulon	1749
	Oriflamme	54	Toulon	1748
95	Sagitaire			
	Aquilon	46	Toulon	1733
	Juno	46	Havre de Grace	1748
			Belleisle	

N°	Ships Names	Guns	Where built	Age
	Belleisle	44	St. Maloes	1757
	Abenakise	40	Canada	
100	Danae	40		
	Hebé	40		
	Outarde	40		
	Saptier	40		
105	Aigrette	36		
	Arethuse	36		
	Begon	36		
	Echo	36		
	Favourite	36	Havre de Grace	1748
	Felicité	36		
110	Harmonie	36		
	Hermione	36	Rochfort	1749
	Le Grand	36		
	Malicieuse	36		
	Baleine	36		
115	Atalante	32	Toulon	1741
	Blonde	32	Havre de Grace	
	Bouffon	32	Rochfort	
	Brune	32	Havre de Grace	
	Diane	32	Toulon	1742
120	Pr. Edward	32		
	Hyene	32	Toulon	1744
	Ophale	32		
	Vestale	32	Toulon	
	Zephire	32	Toulon	1728
125	Amethist	32		
	Marechault	30		
	Bellone	30		
	Cornette	30	Brest	1752
	Concord	30		
130	Fleur de Lys	30	Brest	1754
	Licorne	30		
	Méfiance	30		
	Pylade	30	Toulon	1749
	Pomone	30	Toulon	1749
135	Rose	30	Toulon	1752
		F		Sauvage

N ^o	Ships Names	Guns	Where built	Age
	Sauvage	30	Brest	
	Serieux	30	Brest	
	Surprize	30		
	Sylphide	30		
140	Syren	30		
	Valeur	30		
	Duc. de Choiseul	30		
	Chimere	26		
	Diligente	26		
145	Flore	26	Toulon	
	Tripon	26	Rochfort	
	Mindroe	26	Rochfort	
	Oiseau	26	Toulon	
	Oiseau de Mer	26	Havre de Grace	1759
150	Atalife	24		
	Avise	24		
	Bristol Privateer	24	Bristol	
	Cornette	24	Brest	1751
	Emeraude	24	Havre de Grace	1744
155	Fidelle	24	Rochfort	1747
	Tierce	24	Havre de Grace	1744
	Bien Aimé	22		
	Galatea	24	Brest	1744
	Gracieuse	24	Toulon	1749
160	Heroine	24	Brest	1744
	Hirondelle	24	Toulon	
	Mutine	24	Brest	1744
	Terpsichore	24		
	Thetis	24		
165	Topaze	24	Brest	1750
	Volage	24	Toulon	
	Eclair	22		
	Girlande	22		
	M. de Morlaix	22		
170	Maitre	22	Canada	1746
	Nymphe	22	Rochfort	1750
	Petit Cumberland	20	Brest	
	Messager	20		

Mignone

N°	Ships Names	Guns	Where built	Age
	Mignone	20		
175	Rhinocérat	20		
	Bellone	20		
	Riche	16		
	Calypso	16		
	Bienfaïtant	18		
180	Renommé	18		
	Chevere	16		
	Escarboucle	16		
	Oracle	16		
	Stork	16	England	
185	Turturlelle	16		
	Epreuve	14		
	D. d' Hanover	14		
	Amaranthe	14	Brest	1747
	Anemone	12	Brest	
190	Arc-en-ciel	12	Brest	
	Gigine	12		
	Courstoujours	12		
	Ecureuil	12		
	Hyacinth	12		
195	Legree	12		
	Levrier	12		
	Peramine	12		
	Penelope	12		
	Renoncule	12		
200	Sardoine	12		
	Pie	10		
	Mahone	8		
	Agathe	6		
	Badaire	6		
205	Colombe	6		
	Roi de Prusse	6		
	Monita	4	Brest	
	Postillion	4		

Xebeques or Store-Ships.

N ^o	Ships Names	Guns	Where built	Age
	Indiscrete	24	Toulon	1751
210	Requin	24	Toulon	1750
	Rufe	18	Toulon	1751
	Char ^t . Roy ^l .	60		
	Marie	50		
	Loire	40		
215	Serenade	40	Brest	
	Profond		Rochfort	
	Themis	22		
	Nafaptine	12		
	Charanthe	10		
220	Sarcelle	6	Brest	
	Ballime	6		
	Chameau	6		
	Elephant	6		
	Hermione	4		
225	Penelope	25		
	Repulse	26		
	Le Gramont	26		
	Hawke	14	} English Prizes	
	Virgin	10		
230	Le Barclay	20		
	Le Mercure	10		
	Le Lutine	36		
	Le Mutine	24		
	Le Seneclere	24		
	Duc. de Fronfac	20		
236	Le Soleil Royal	24		

Guns 9656 which at a thousand pounds a gun, (an estimate I am informed will give us the cost of a ship fitted out) is 9, 656, 000 £. The reader will perceive that much the greatest part of this navy, was built after the year 1748.

Numb.

Numb. 2.

Paper on the rights of the two nations to Canada.

THE French were constantly drove out of all parts of North-America by the English, who first discovered and seized that whole continent. They were even driven out of Canada itself in 1627, 1628, and 1629, and never had any right there (notwithstanding all the pains their commissaries take, by many false assertions to make out a title) till a right was given them by Charles I. by the treaty of St. Germain in 1632; who thereby only surrendered to them, *tous les lieux occupés en la nouvelle France*, &c. All the places occupied (or seized) in New France, Acadia, or Canada, by the subjects of his majesty of Great-Britain. Now it appears from the accounts of Champlain, governor of the country, and all others; that the only places *occupied, seized or possessed*, in those countries, either by the French or English at that time, were Port Royal and St. Saviours in Nova Scotia, with Tadoussac and Quebec in Canada. The two first of these places they restored to us by the treaty of Utrecht; and for the two last they were to indemnify our subjects, meaning Sir David Kirk, the only lawful proprietor of them, to whom the king had granted them, and from whom he could not take them without a valuable consideration, amounting to five thousand pounds, which the French never paid, but still owe; as appears from a memorial of Sir Lewis Kirk and his brother, to king Charles II. after the restoration, and many other accounts.

By this treaty then the king gave up only those *places*, and not the *countries*. For that reason he confirmed his former grants of the *country* of Canada the very next year after the treaty of St. Germain, as appears from the said memorial, the words of which are, “the king of England taking notice that altho’ the forts and castles according to the league were delivered up into the possession of the French (especially such as had been erected during their possession thereof) yet that his subjects were not to be excluded from trade or free commerce in those regions, that were first discovered and possessed by his subjects, did, with the advice of his council, by his letters patents dated May 11th 1633—Grant unto Sir Lewis Kirk—full privilege, not only of trade and commerce in the river Canada, (St. Lawrence, so called) and places on either side adjacent; but also to plant colonies, and build forts and bulwarks, wherever they should think fit.”—And not only so, but the king and parliament that same year 1633, ratified and confirmed to the subjects of Britain, five different grants they had made both of Nova Scotia and Canada in the years 1621, 25, 27, 28, and 33, instead of ceding those countries to the French—For these reasons Cromwell
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took Nova Scotia from them in 1654, and maintained our right to it at the treaty of Westminster in 1655. And altho' they had a right to Nova Scotia given them afterwards by the treaty of Breda, yet they never had any to Canada nor any part of it, but the two places here mentioned. And if due enquiry is made, it will appear that they have no just right or title to any other part of North-America, unless we allow usurpation and encroachment to be a right. For these reasons Queen Anne maintained in a manifesto in 1711, *her just, and incontestible rights to all North-America—except a part yielded to France—which was held in fief from the crown of Britain, and ought to revert to it—* And the city of London, in the 22d article of their instructions to their representatives in parliament, after the treaty of Utrecht, ordered that enquiry be made, *why the French were left in possession of Canada?* There is a great change in affairs then in so short a time as since the treaty of Utrecht, if the French now claim twenty in twenty-five parts of all North-America, who then had only a right to these two places; or at most, no further than from the mouth of the river St. Lawrence to Montreal, with some small claim they may have about Lake Superior perhaps.—1757.

Numb. 3.

Extract from a preliminary convention, proposed by France to Great-Britain, in 1755.

“**T**HE subjects of his Most Christian Majesty, and of his Britannic Majesty, shall evacuate all the country, situated between the river Ohio and the mountains which form the limits of Virginia; and shall withdraw, that is to say, the French beyond the said river, and the English to this side the said mountains; so that all the extent of ground which lies between the said river and the said mountains, shall be considered as a neutral country, during the whole time that this convention shall last; and all the concessions, if there should be any such made by either side, on the said territory, shall be considered as null and of none effect*.

* This is a parallel case to the article offered by Mr. Pitt concerning the intermediate Indians, between our colonies and Louisiana; and shews how consonant such an article would have been with the views of the French.

Numb.

Numb. 4.

Extract from a memorial delivered by the duke de Mirois to the British Ministry 1755.

Of the LIMITS of CANADA.

THE court of France has, in a decisive manner rejected, and will always reject the proposition which has been made by England; that the southern coasts of the river St. Lawrence, and the Lakes Ontario and Erie, should serve as limits between the two nations—It must be laid down as a basis for the negotiation in regard to this article, that the river St. Lawrence is the center of Canada. This truth is justified by just titles, by eminent writers, and by possession.—All that France can agree to, after laying down this principle, which cannot admit of any reasonable contradiction; is to examine in regard to this object, whether the reciprocal convenience of both nations, may not require in this respect, some particular arrangement in order to the fixing invariably, the respective limits.—The only pretext with which the English endeavour to gloss over their pretensions, is taken from article XV. of the treaty of Utrecht; but if all the expressions contained in this article are examined into with due attention, it will evidently appear, that nothing is less founded than the inductions, which the court of London would in fact draw from thence, &c.

Numb. 5.

The Nineteenth Article of the treaty of Utrecht.

HOWever in case (which God Almighty forbid) the dissensions which have been laid asleep, should at any time be renewed between their said royal majesties, or their successors, and break out into open war, the ships, merchandizes, and all the effects, both moveable and immoveable, on both sides, which shall be found to remain in the ports and in the dominions of the adverse party, shall not be confiscated or any wise damaged; but the entire space of six months, to be reckoned from the day of the rupture, shall be allowed to the said subjects of each of their Royal Majesties, in which they may sell the aforesaid things, or any part else of their effects; or carry and remove them from thence whither they please, without any molestation, and retire from thence themselves.

Numb.

Numb. 6.

Paper on the importance of the Newfoundland fishery, by Mr. Postlethwayte.

“THE French have taken every measure to improve their fisheries in general since the treaty of Utrecht. They have exceedingly increased that to Newfoundland as well on the coast as on the Great Bank. Nor do they fish only on the Great Bank, for such fish as are cured without drying, as the Dutch do in their white herring fishery in the open sea; but have had the address to obtain, that the island of Cape Breton should be yielded to them to fortify, and do what they please with; where they have been long struggling to establish another Dunkirk, to the ruin of the British American commerce; and where they carry on their dry fishery as well as at Placentia. *But as if this was not privilege enough for them, we have impolitically granted them the liberty to resort to the very island of Newfoundland itself, and erect stages, &c. to cure and dry their fish, to the unspeakable detriment of our fishery there.*

In the time of king Charles I. the French paid us a tribute for the liberty of curing and drying fish at Newfoundland, and we could deprive them of it whenever we pleased. Of late years they have not only ceased to pay tribute, but, by their neighbourhood at Cape Breton, will oblige us to keep large garrisons as well at Nova Scotia as Newfoundland, if we will prevent our being surprized; where at Newfoundland they have the liberty of the fishing season equally with us, from Cape Bonavista northward to the northern point of the said island, and by which they are also become our rivals, in a very fine salmon fishery there. The French are now become so much our competitors in this trade, and are increased to such a degree, that they employ yearly above five hundred sail of shipping to carry on their fishing on the Great Bank of Newfoundland, and on the coast of that island; that is in their wet and dry fish: hereby they have not only supplied themselves with the fish they formerly took from us, but furnish many parts of Spain and Italy therewith to our prodigious loss.”

Surely this paper proves the bad consequences of the article on this subject in the British Memorial!

Numb.

Numb. 7.

An estimate of the value of the Imports, &c. of our sugar colonies.

From the African traders in negroes. ——— —	£.
From Ireland in beef, pork, herrings, butter, &c. ———	240,000
From our northern colonies, in horses, lumber, fish, biscuit, flower, corn, &c. } ———	100,000
From the Madeira traders in wine ——— —	250,000
From Great-Britain, directly in goods and merchandize ———	80,000
And they pay in Britain on their own produce, for duty, about ———	400,000
For freight ——— ——— ———	200,000
For commission, brokerage, &c. to factors ——— ———	275,000
	195,000
	1,740,000
And the ballance of their produce (which produce has been about 1,950,000 l. as near as we can calculate) All centers in England, being for interest of money, for expences of absentees residing here, education of children, governors, and other officers } ———	210,000
	1,950,000

Or 114,000,000 l. since the restoration.

The value of the yearly transactions in this circle of trade, may be computed as follows :

By the annual produce ——— ———	£.
By their annual expences and charges ——— —	1,950,000
By ballance centering in England as abovementioned ———	1,740,000
By sugar and other productions re-exported ——— —	210,000
By returns made for the said re-exported goods ——— ———	600,000
	720,000
	5,220,000

The last two articles Great-Britain has lost to the French. Sure these estimates shew how much our ministry were to blame for offering to restore the island of Guardaloupe, when their sugar-trade so much exceeded ours, and when we

see the immense value of this important branch! At the time when this calculation was made, the French re-exported to the amount of 1,000,000 *l.* The difference of encouragement between the two nations, will be seen from the following

Calculation of the yearly produce and expence of a great Barbadoes planter.

Suppose the planter possessed of

	<i>£.</i>
1000 Acres of land (with 5 wind-mills, and 3 or 4 sugar works) at 20 <i>l.</i> per acre	20,000
500 Negroes at 30 <i>l.</i> per head	15,000
200 Head of cattle, for work and dung at 10 <i>l.</i>	2,000
40 Horses for work and dung 20 <i>l.</i>	800
20 Asses for Ditto at 40 <i>s.</i>	40
100 Sheep at 20 <i>s.</i>	100
100 Hogs for Ditto at 12 <i>s.</i>	60
	38,000
The buildings together with coppers, stills, worm-tubs, coolers, leaden cisterns, wind-mill-cases, brasses, pots, drips, waggons, carts, and many other plantation utensils may cost	12,000
The yearly produce,	50,000
	<i>£.</i>
Pots of sugar (at 60 <i>lb.</i> each) 7000 at 9 <i>s.</i>	3,150
Rum and melasses	1,050
	4,200

N. B. If the sugar be improved by claying, it is computed such an estate will clear to the planter 350*l.* over-and-above the 1000*l.* as under. So that the most the planter gains from his estate is 2*l.* 14*s.* per Cent. For 1000*l.* on 50,000*l.* is but 2*l.* per Cent. and 1350*l.* no more than 2*l.* 14*s.* per Cent. per Ann.

The

The yearly expence.

	£.
Salaries for managers, overseers, drivers, workmen, bookkeeper, } town agents, doctors, farriers, &c.	500
60 Barrels of beef and pork	100
60 Hogheads of refuse fish or herrings	300
Flour, bread, and bacon	50
Cloaths for 500 negroes at 6s per head	150
Oats, beans, and corn	300
Lumber	200
Carpenters, smiths, masons, plumbers, brasiers, wheelwrights	150
Charges for the militia	150
Repairs	120
Supply of utensils	180
Supply of negroes	700
Ditto of cattle	120
Ditto of horses	160
Ditto of asses	20
	3,200
Ballance to the planter	1,000
	4,200

Calculation of the yearly produce and expence of a great French sugar planter,
on rich and fresh lands.

Suppose him possessed of,

	£.
1000 Acres of land, the charges of taking it up, &c. we will } say may come to	150
200 Negroes at 30l.	6,000
100 Head of cattle (for work and bread) at 30s.	150
Horses and mules	200
Sheep, hogs, &c. will more than answer the charges of keeping } by their encrease	
Building implements, and utensils of all sorts	2,000
	8,500

The

The yearly produce.

Pounds of Moscovado sugar, 420,000 at 8s. per hundred	£. 1,680
Gallons of rum and melasses 21,000 (which is 5 for every hundred weight of sugar) rum at 8d. melasses at 4d. per gallon; the medium at 6d. per gallon, comes to	525
	2,205

N. B. It appears from this calculation, that the French planter gains a ballance of 1,555 *l. per Annum.* by laying out 8,500 *l.* which is interest for his money at the rate of 18 *l.* 5s. 10d. *per Cent. per Annum.* Formerly when the English planter had the like advantages, he gained 20 *per Cent.* and then could well afford to allow 15 *per Cent.* interest.

The yearly expence.

Salaries to managers	£. 150
Salt provisions, beef, pork, fish, &c.	160
Cloaths for 200 negroes, at 10s. per head	100
Timber and materials for repairs	70
Workmanship	40
Supply of utensils	50
Negroes (nothing)	
Cattle (nothing)	
Horses and mules	40
Expences that may be omitted	40
	650
Ballance to planter	1,555
	2,205

N. B. That France has transported her people to her sugar colonies, and given them a year's provisions and land for nothing; that on Hispaniola cattle are bought for four, five, or six pieces of eight; that timber and fresh provisions being raised on their own lands lessens the expence; that negroes not being overworked, they encrease, rather than decrease, and so do the cattle, &c. *Heavy articles these against our sugar islands!*

F I N I S.